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This article provides a critical analysis of ‘the legal’ in the legal determinants of health, with reference to the
Lancet–O’Neill report on that topic. The analysis shows how law is framed as a fluid and porous concept, with
legal measures and instruments being conceived as sociopolitical phenomena. I argue that the way that laws
are grounded practically as part of a broader concept of politics and evaluated normatively for their
instrumental value has important implications for the study of law itself. This, in turn, has implications for
how we approach the transdisciplinary ambitions that form a key part of the report’s recommendations to
enhance law’s capacity to promote better, more equitable population health at local, national, international
and global levels.
The Legal Determinants of Health
and the Lancet–O’Neill Report:
Background and Framing
This article critically explores ‘the legal’ in the legal
determinants of health, as represented in the Lancet–
O’Neill Institute of Georgetown University
Commission report (the Lancet–O’Neill report) entitled
The Legal Determinants of Health: Harnessing the Power
of Law for Global Health and Sustainable Development
(Gostin et al., 2019). The report, whose lead author is
the pioneering public and global health lawyer
Lawrence Gostin, is a commendable contribution to
efforts better to shape structural factors that impact
the public’s health at local, national, international and
global levels. It is a critical work that looks to the power
of law: law’s strong determinative effects, for better and
for worse, on our social, governmental, commercial and
physical environments; and their consequent impacts
on health and health inequalities. And the report is an
aspirational and directive work: it looks to law’s place
and potential in public and global health agendas to
achieve fairer and healthier societies. In the authors’
words:
This Lancet Commission articulates the crucial
role of law in achieving global health with justice,
through legal instruments, legal capacities, and
institutional reforms, as well as a firm commit-
ment to the rule of law. The Commission’s aim is
to enhance the global health community’s under-
standing of law, regulation, and the rule of law as
effective tools to advance population health and
equity. (Gostin et al., 2019: 1857)
The Lancet–O’Neill report advances recommenda-
tions that together aim to extend and refine law’s cap-
acity to protect health, promote well-being and reduce
health inequalities within and across nations. The
Commission argues that this capacity may be realized
through three functions that law might lend to the meth-
ods of social coordination and collective activity that are
central to assuring the conditions for good and equitable
health in ways that cannot be realized through individ-
ual, or individual-focused, efforts (cf Verweij and
Dawson, 2009). These arise from: first, law’s prospective
function in establishing standards and norms to guide
different actors and agencies; second, its methods of dis-
pute resolution that clarify and enforce obligations, as
well as serving policy agendas through strategic litigation
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efforts; and third, its functions in strengthening the gov-
ernance of public and private institutions (Gostin et al.,
2019: 1863–1868).
One component of the capacity building that the re-
port recommends concerns the links between the study
of law and its consequent incorporation in public and
global health agendas, research and practice. In particu-
lar, the report emphasizes the problems caused by dis-
ciplinary silos and by the relative rarity of expertise that
spans law and public/global health:
Researchers and practitioners in law and in health
have traditionally worked in quite distinct ways.
In the medical profession, as in the wider public,
understanding or recognition of the power of law
to drive behavioural and social change is lacking.
[. . .] For their part, lawyers can be protective of
their turf and unwilling to acknowledge the limits
of their subject-matter expertise. This silo men-
tality leads to missed opportunities for teaching,
research, practice, and problem-solving. (Gostin
et al., 2019: 1898)
Given such concerns about monodisciplinary isola-
tionism, my aim here is to contribute reflections from
the perspective of a legal scholar with interests in the
philosophy, practice and politics of public and global
health. I do so with reference to the different character-
izations of law (and thus legal determinants) within the
Lancet–O’Neill report and with reference to the ration-
alizations of its recommendations concerning practical
and academic engagement with law. The repeated char-
acterization of law as a tool—as per the opening quota-
tion in this article—presents law as something to be
understood within an agenda that spans sectors and sys-
tems, rather than as a concept or practice that may use-
fully—meaningfully, even—be isolated or understood
in purely abstract terms. This leads to the view that
‘the legal’ in the legal determinants of health is best con-
ceived as a fluid and porous idea. It requires to be under-
stood in context and over time. Insofar as this permits an
intradisciplinary legal perspective, it is one that would
shape the study of law as something that itself embraces
varied and contingent methods and points of reference.
Such an understanding of law suggests that lawyers’
‘subject-matter expertise’ must extend, on its own terms,
beyond technical and procedural questions concerning
laws themselves. Whilst it would be complacent to allow
this to nullify concerns about ‘protecting turf’ or
obstacles to working across professions and disciplines,
a broader and less cohesive appreciation of law as a single
discipline lends itself well to the transdisciplinary ambi-
tions of the Lancet–O’Neill report.
To examine the points of synergy and disconnect be-
tween law(s), justice and healthy outcomes, it is useful to
explore and explain how law itself is conceptualized by
the Lancet–O’Neill Commission. In the remainder of
this article, I will argue that as the characterization of
law moves from a ‘purer’ concept to something more
porous and varied, so its disciplinary boundaries weaken
and its internal coherence, or disciplinary purity, dimin-
ishes. I accordingly refer to the idea of law: following
(after a fashion) Amartya Sen’s approach to understand-
ing justice through plural grounding and non-ideal the-
ory (cf Sen, 2009), I consider it both normatively and
practically preferable not to work with a singular, pure
account of law, but rather to allow for legal determinants
to cover a range of radically distinct ideas and forms. I
will show that whilst laws are explained in the Lancet–
O’Neill report as having distinguishing features both
formally and institutionally, they are ultimately con-
ceived as sociopolitical phenomena: they are part of a
broader array of mechanisms that represent sociopolit-
ical power and its exercise.
The Idea of Law in the Lancet–O’Neill
Report
On its face, the Lancet–O’Neill report works with a con-
tained concept of law that, whilst socially contingent,
may be represented as appealing to features of a pure
or prototypical understanding of what law and legal sys-
tems are, and how they impact society. The Commission
writes:
The term law throughout is used to mean legal
instruments such as statutes, treaties, and regula-
tions that express public policy, as well as the
public institutions (eg, courts, legislatures, and
agencies) responsible for creating, implementing,
and interpreting the law. By establishing the rules
and frameworks that shape social and economic
interactions, laws exert a powerful force on all the
social determinants of health. (Gostin et al., 2019:
1857)
In this initial framing, law is presented as a distinct
and particularly potent source of power, control and
coordination. And the distinguishing features of laws,
and of legal actors and agencies, are ones that we might
associate with concepts found in socially grounded the-
ories of legal positivism; notably, those focused on the
domestic legal systems of sovereign states (cf Hart, 1994).
Domestic legal systems are commonly perceived as
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than is found in international law and legal systems. This
is so in particular given national systems’ (generally)
clearer constitutional bases, the more practically and
conceptually coherent nature of their institutional
arrangements and the consequently greater rigour of
their claims to authority and effectiveness.
International legal measures and instruments might be
said to be ‘less like law’ than domestic ones: they exhibit,
so this position holds, fewer of the features and institu-
tional arrangements with reference to which we identify
something as law.
Despite, therefore, its opening representation of law,
and thus what would constitute legal determinants, as
the report progresses, we come to find the embrace of
broader, less pure ideas of law. This is both reasonable
and unsurprising given the Lancet–O’Neill
Commission’s focus on global health. As noted, accom-
modation of measures and instruments within inter-
national law that do not enjoy all of the defining
trappings of domestic laws accords with many jurispru-
dential traditions and assumptions (Fidler, 2008;
Coggon, 2014). It conforms too with the distinct
emphases and framing in Gostin’s definition of global
health law in his independent work, which is more firmly
rooted in concepts of governance (Gostin, 2014), as con-
trasted with Gostin and Lindsay Wiley’s definition of
(national) public health law, which more rigidly focuses
on prototypical concepts of law and legal form (Gostin
and Wiley, 2016). It bears stressing, having made these
points, that the Lancet–O’Neill report’s overall emphasis
on the functions of law (outlined in the opening section
of this paper) and its instrumentalist approach to under-
standing and evaluating law mean that there is an em-
brace of governance within the legal determinants of
health, both at domestic and international/transnation-
al/global levels (see also Coggon et al., 2017: chapter 4).
‘The Legal’ within the Political
Determinants of Health
The approach taken in the Lancet–O’Neill report, which
does not limit its concerns to structural and regulatory
features that are born of strict legal form, means that the
conceptual reach of legal determinants both pervades
and is pervaded by matters that are not strictly law, but
which by analysis require to be understood if law itself is
to be understood. I will argue that this means that legal
determinants are integrated within the political determi-
nants of health: that is the overall aspects of power, con-
trol and coordination that reside (or arguably should
reside) with governmental actors and agencies (legal
and otherwise) (see also Coggon, 2012: chapter 11).
The placing of legal determinants within political
determinants is most starkly represented through the
Lancet–O’Neill Commission’s self-linking to the report
of the earlier Lancet–University of Oslo Commission’s
report on Global Governance for Health (the Lancet–
Oslo report) (Ottersen et al., 2014). The Lancet–
O’Neill report says that it ‘builds on’ (Gostin et al.,
2019: 1859) the work of that earlier Commission. In so
doing, it explains the overlaps between law and govern-
ance, whilst emphasizing that governance has a wider
embrace: ‘Law is central to governance, but governance
goes beyond law’ (Gostin et al., 2019: 1877). We may
accept this categorization, whilst also accepting that
the plural understandings of law within the Lancet–
O’Neill report mean that law itself is a diffuse and rang-
ing idea rather than in an entirely separable analytical
(and practical) class with its own firm borders.
Governance is a broad and multifarious categorization;
law is a graded and pluralistic one that sits within it.
The overall reach of the ‘more diffuse concept’
(Gostin et al., 2019: 1877) of governance is explained
by the Lancet–O’Neill Commission’s quoting Thomas
Weiss and Ramesh Thakur’s definition, which was
adopted by the Lancet–Oslo Commission. They charac-
terize global governance as:
The complex of formal and informal institutions,
mechanisms, relationships, and processes be-
tween and among states, markets, citizens, and
organisations, both intergovernmental and non-
governmental, through which collective interests
on the global plane are articulated, rights and
obligations are established, and differences are
mediated. (Thakur and Weiss, 2006)
The Lancet–Oslo report directly addresses the political
determinants of health. It ‘examines power disparities
and dynamics across a range of policy areas that affect
health and that require improved global governance’
(Ottersen et al., 2014: 630). The Lancet–O’Neill
Commission emphasizes how law may provide greater
rigour to efforts in governance for health (note especially
the third function of law listed in the opening section of
this article). However, the legal in the legal determinants
of health cannot be approached only with understanding
of ‘pure’ instances of law. This is because, first, legal
governance is part of governance writ large. Second,
the idea of legal itself enjoys an expansive and pluralistic
understanding. And third, law (writ narrow)’s strengths,
weaknesses and ultimate capacity cannot be understood
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without an understanding of the wider social and gov-
ernance contexts. Legal determinants may be less diffuse
than all of the political determinants, but they are still
diffuse and of the same kind. Such framing of legal deter-
minants is reinforced if we consider both how the
Lancet–O’Neill Commission invites law to be under-
stood as a grounded, sociopolitical phenomenon, and
how its normative evaluations of and prescriptions for
law are determined by extra-legal, moral considerations.
Regarding the first point, the Lancet–O’Neill report
urges that laws be conceived as lived, evolving, empirical
phenomena: they cannot be understood in the abstract
or in isolation, and their meaning is found and changes
in context and over time. The Commission writes:
Enacting a good health law is only the first step
towards building an effective legal environment.
Laws that are defined as on the books must be
supported by effective processes for their drafting
(including public participation), implementa-
tion, enforcement, monitoring, evaluation, and
ultimately their revision or repeal where neces-
sary[.] (Gostin et al., 2019: 1894)
If a scholar’s or practitioner’s understanding of law
were limited to contained (siloed) expertise, she could
not on this count understand law. Expertise in law
requires capacities that extend beyond technical legal
knowledge; a point that supports calls for transdiscipli-
nary approaches to public and global health law. In a
study cited in the Lancet–O’Neill report, Burris et al.
(2016: 138) demonstrate how public health law does
not exist exclusively ‘within the professional jurisdiction
of lawyers’. In explaining their ideas, they focus in par-
ticular on legal epidemiology, which examines the popu-
lation health effects of law, legal practice and policy (so
again not limited to a pure account of law) by combining
the practical and epistemological resources and tradi-
tions of law with those of epidemiological research.
Such transdisciplinarity is crucial, but in developing
the capacity for this, there are important lessons too for
legal scholarship and studies in an intradisciplinary
sense. The indications in the report of what law is, and
what is required to study and practise law, undermine
any meaningful case that might be made for narrow or
siloed approaches to legal studies. Insofar as this is not
already recognized and reflected in practice (and there
will be variation within and across different academic
traditions; cf Bartie, 2010; Siems and Mac Sı́thigh,
2012), law as a discipline itself requires to be (re)config-
ured in a way that is not (in principle) consistent with its
being a silo. At the levels of analysis and practice, the
report promotes the idea of law as an area of expertise
that contains distinct approaches and methods. These
naturally fall within the traditions of critical, socio-
legal studies (for discussion of socio-legal approaches
in the context of health and law, see Farrell et al.,
2017). Reflecting on law in this way supports the
Lancet–O’Neill Commission’s transdisciplinary ambi-
tions within public and global health law:
Building the empirical evidence base for effective
health laws first requires building disciplinary
bridges: mutual understanding, collaboration,
common terminologies, and an appreciation of
how different skill sets can be applied to public
health problems. It also requires genuine interdis-
ciplinary (or even transdisciplinary) research,
drawing on the expertise of legal scholars, epi-
demiologists, clinical scientists, policy analysts,
behaviour change experts, and anthropologists,
amongst others, working together. (Gostin et al.,
2019: 1901)
However, wider philosophical as well as empirical
understanding is needed. Moving to law’s normative
foundations and our critical evaluations of it, I would
urge that the above ideas be taken further, both as
regards intradisciplinary reflection on law, and in terms
of the disciplinary reach that public and global health
agendas aim to achieve. Burris et al. (2016: 139) give
some attention to ‘normative framing and analysis’,
and the Lancet–O’Neill report has justice and commit-
ments to democratic ideals of human rights and the rule
of law written through to its core. However, a much
more prominent role for (political) philosophy and eth-
ics requires to be built into agendas at all levels for the
public’s health. This becomes clear when we see how the
foundational and directive idea of ‘good laws’ within the
Lancet–O’Neill report is not to be understood by narrow
reference to legal form or procedure, or the technical
soundness of legal argument. Nor is it to be understood
by reference (say) to natural law positions that rest on
necessary conceptual links between ‘central cases of law’
and theories of morality (cf e.g. Finnis, 1980).
In contradistinction with jurisprudential studies that
focus on bare, formalist concerns of what law is and how
it works, or a core concept of law defined by its necessary
relationship with morality, the Lancet–O’Neill
Commission drives its conceptual understandings of
law in the ways explained above, whilst evaluating and
establishing the proper use of law by reference to moral
ideas found in health and justice. The report operates on
the basis that law may be variously understood, but it is
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strengths as a tool. The moral evaluations themselves
might be seen as built on, and indeed constrained by,
fundamental democratic ideals embodied by human
rights and the rule of law; foundational concepts in legal
philosophy. But they draw from health-focused consid-
erations in justice too. These might be characterised as
deriving, for example, from claims that health is a fun-
damental moral value (see e.g. Gostin, 2008; Gostin and
Wiley, 2016: chapter 1). And they might—additionally
or alternatively—be seen as being informed by accounts
of the moral foundations of public health practice, which
tend to be rooted in combined concerns for protecting
and improving health and reducing unfair health
inequalities (see Coggon and Viens, 2017). In relation
to each of these, the moral determinants in health lead to
claims about governments’ responsibilities for the pub-
lic’s health; i.e. they represent (possible) moral founda-
tions to the political (including legal) determinants of
health and require to be analyzed and evaluated within
such a framing (see Coggon, 2012: 277–283). Crucially,
both in terms of legal studies and public and global
health agendas, the normative foundations are not
understood by exclusive reference to the internal work-
ings or epistemologies of a ‘pure’ understanding of law.
In keeping with the Lancet–O’Neill Commission’s
rationales and recommendations, my push for the sig-
nificance of philosophical contributions is one that
invites their inclusion in concert with approaches and
insights from other disciplines (see further Coggon,
2012: chapter 7). This includes disciplines within the
health sciences, but also other sources of critical theory,
and areas such as anthropology, political sciences and
sociology. Moral and broader philosophical argumenta-
tion alone will not be sufficient to motivate sociopolitical
(including legal) changes to the determinants of (ill)
health (Gostin, 2008; Coggon, 2014), but it is necessary
to the rigour of the claims that would underpin imper-
atives to improve health (howsoever understood) and
advance particular concepts of equity. And this necessity
does not end with abstract claims about justice: as indi-
cated in other papers in this journal issue, critical atten-
tion is required in identifying the lens through which we
scrutinize questions of equity in relation to public and
global health, and in looking at the implications and
consequences (intended and unintended) of different
social situations, policies and proposals for intervention
and reform (Gangoli, 2020; Hawkes and Buse, 2020;
McGuinness and Montgomery, 2020). The aspirations
towards global health with justice require ethical justifi-
cation that can both challenge harmful aspects of the
status quo and support arguments for what should re-
place it, and within what normative constraints. A
scientific evidence base may be crucial to the rigour of
public health law, but the work of legal determinants
must have broader foundations than (say) epidemiology
(Horton, 2018; Venkatapuram and Bibby, 2018): it
extends as well to include bases in approaches to identi-
fying and responding to concerns through the methods
of political philosophy; in debates on justice. And—
again in keeping with the Lancet–O’Neill report’s rec-
ommendations—such forms of analysis will need to
continue over time and be subject to revision in their
detail as circumstances and understandings change.
Conclusions: Laws as Means; Better,
Fairer Global Health as an End
Seeing the legal determinants of health as part of the
political determinants, seeing the drivers for change as
coming from separable moral concerns and working
with a fluid and porous concept of ‘the legal’ mean
that pure instances of law arise to be measured alongside
other methods and systems of governance. Nothing in
these observations serves to deny that law may bring
moral as well as practical authority and underpinnings
to questions of social ethics, including those concerning
the public’s health: that is why the Lancet–O’Neill report
(rightly) identifies the vital importance of promoting
fundamental ideals such as the rule of law, equality be-
fore the law, human rights and the empowering effect of
the right to health. Nevertheless, the framing in the re-
port provides that the sovereignty of nation states is the
source of their authority, including their law-making
authority. It is from that authority, the Commission
argues, that states’ duty to protect and promote the pub-
lic’s health arises; a duty that is underscored by the in-
ability of individuals acting alone to do so (Gostin et al.,
2019: 1862–1863). Accordingly, the report can be seen as
separating normative ideas such as health as a moral
value, social justice and the rule of law on the one
hand, from more practically grounded points where
laws and their effects are seen as empirical aspects of
sociopolitical realities on the other hand. In these latter
regards, empirical observations and analysis of power
dynamics and influence provide real-world context
and themselves shape laws; and our understandings of
law.
The broad range of approaches to comprehending
and analysing ‘the legal’ in the legal determinants of
health is well captured in the following summary:
The most just and effective public health laws
share the following four core characteristics:
they are evidence based, equity promoting,
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multisectoral, and supported by good govern-
ance[.] (Gostin et al., 2019: 1882)
Seeing laws in broad terms, and evaluating them by
reference to their effects rather than (say) their form or
institutional (or even constitutional) foundations, lends
itself naturally to the inter- and transdisciplinary points
that the Lancet–O’Neill Commission recommends
should pervade educational agendas in public and global
health. If we accept the view that ‘law is only a tool, and
its effectiveness depends on how this tool is used’
(Gostin et al., 2019: 1889), we move to a position where
legal studies, and the legal determinants of health, nei-
ther start nor end with ‘the law’. As well as providing
reasons to knock down barriers to working between dis-
ciplines, this has significant implications for the discip-
line of law itself.
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